The key insight I want to share is this: moral judgment should focus not on actions themselves, but on the contexts that give those actions their moral weight. This distinction, though it may seem academic, can transform how we think about ethics and how we interact with others.
A week or so ago...
I published ​an episode of my podcast​ that answered a listener's question about rape and, specifically, whether or not it was actually a moral indifferent (given the Stoic concept of "indifferent things").
As you read this article, keep in the forefront of your mind the insight I am expounding on: moral judgment should focus not on actions themselves, but on the contexts that give those actions their moral weight. This distinction, though it may seem academic, unnecessary, or even, to some, a given, can transform how we think about ethics and how we interact with others.
In the episode I explained, in so many words, that the concept of indifferent things applies to actions, thoughts, opinions, and choices but not to contexts. Rape, I explained, isn't an action, it is a context that informs the moral value of the actions happening within it. This philosophical distinction matters because it reveals something crucial about how we make moral judgments in our daily lives.
Explained through a less perturbing scenario: When someone shoots another person, and that person dies, the context could be murder or it could be self-defense. Either way, neither murder nor self defense are the action being morally assessed. Instead, they are the labels we apply after moral assessment.
This distinction, of course, and in concerns to our practical day-to-day lives, is kind of pedantic and unnecessary-feeling. We all know rape is evil and we don't need Stoic ethical theory to explain why.
However — within the context of nuanced philosophical navel-gazing, anyway — it is an important distinction to understand as it can make us better thinkers.
The Problem: We've Become Lazy Thinkers
When we see actions (our own or those of others) as the substance of moral judgement, we make it easy to excuse bad behaviour.
I believe the ancient Stoics would be appalled by the degree to which we (the contemporary citizens of the Cosmopolis) are ruled primarily by our initial emotional responses. They would say we've become lazy thinkers. They would also say we've become "like an abscess" on the Universe. As Marcus Aurelius wrote:
The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry. In the third place the soul does violence to itself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity. — Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2.16
Five Ways We Misunderstand Moral Judgment
Marcus Aurelius identifies five ways we harm ourselves, and each relates directly to our failure to understand the action/context distinction:
We are vexed by nearly everything, and we turn away from our fellow human beings constantly (often due to that vexation). We frequently allow ourselves to over-indulge, to the extent that harmless indulgences become chronic disruptors or addictions, and we often tell lies about how we feel or what we intend to do. Finally, we are frequently careless with our thoughts and actions. We enter into all manner of undertakings, conversations, and duties without really thinking them through. This can make us unreliable.
How do these things relate to (incorrectly) believing that actions are the substance of moral judgement?
First, we are vexed because others act in ways we think they shouldn't—but we don't have access to their minds, so we can't know (all) their context. Maybe they stole a loaf of bread, but maybe they stole it to feed their children. When we judge the action alone, we miss the potential injustices driving the desperation (injustices that might contextualize the action and enable us to be more Just in our moral assessment of it).
Second, we turn away from our fellow human beings because we've decided their actions, whose contexts we are (at least partially) ignorant of, are both what we're judging and what deserve our scorn. A parent yells at their child and we think "what a piece of work that woman/man is!" and we revile them. Yet we don't see the sleepless nights, the financial stress, or the moment of human frailty that preceded that outburst.
Third, we over-indulge because we've decided there is moral goodness in acts that make us feel nice (and that it's always good to feel as nice as we can). We might justify excessive drinking by focusing on the act of "relaxing after work" without examining the contexts of escapism or self-medication.
Fourth, we tell lies because the act of lying is mistakenly believed to be good when it protects us or saves the feelings of others. We tell our friend their haircut looks great when it doesn't, focusing on the act of "being kind" rather than the context of authentic relationship-building.
Fifth, we are careless with our thoughts and actions because we've convinced ourselves that what matters is the outcome or the appearance, not the integrity or intention behind what we do. We might volunteer at a charity for the sake of our resumé rather than from genuine care, focusing on the act of "helping" while ignoring the context of self-interest.
Using the Action/Context Distinction as a Safeguard
Once we understand that it is the context of any action, choice, or opinion that determines its moral value (and not the action, choice, or opinion itself), we enable ourselves to do the introspective version of "peeking behind the curtain."
Instead of reacting to the surface of things, we begin investigating the structure beneath. Not just "What was done?" but "Why was it done? What were the intentions, the constraints, the pressures?" We begin living like philosophers, not prosecutors.
This shift transforms not only how we see others, but how we see ourselves. When we approach life as prosecutors, we build cases; when we approach it as philosophers, we build understanding. We stop rushing to judgment and start cultivating what the Stoics called practical wisdom—the ability to see each situation in its fullness and respond appropriately (and thus, Justly).
The next time you find yourself quick to judge an action—whether someone else's or your own—pause. Remember that actions are morally indifferent until context gives them meaning. In that pause, in that moment of curiosity about context rather than certainty about actions, we find our path away from being what Marcus called "an abscess on the universe" and toward being rational, compassionate members of the human community.